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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [IAEA](#) [IR](#)

SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: JOINT P5+1 STATEMENT FOR IAEA BOARD OF
GOVERNORS HITS RUSSIAN ROADBLOCK

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b) and (c)

Summary

¶1. (C) At a German-convened P5 1 meeting on September 4, Russian Ambassador Zmeyerovskiy refused to discuss the German-proposed text for a joint P5 1 statement on the Iran issue at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting opening Monday, September 7. Over the course of nearly two hours, and seconded by China, Zmeyerovskiy asserted that he could not engage on a text that his Political Director could not agree to in discussions at that level in Germany on September 2. Zmeyerovskiy said his instructions were only to discuss whether a joint statement was desirable, but if others insisted on discussing a text, the basis of the discussion would have to be the German host's press summary of the September 2 political director's meeting. The Russians asserted a joint statement was only desirable if it accentuated the positive in order to encourage Iran to engage us. In the end, German Ambassador Luedeking pledged to take one more shot at a productive discussion of text by re-circulating a new draft that would combine elements of the original German draft with elements from the September 2 press summary. Amb. Davies, as well as his German, French, and UK colleagues made clear that any statement that was out of step with the predominantly negative August 28 IAEA Director General's report would be inappropriate. P5 1 Ambassadors will convene again Monday, September 7 to discuss a revised German draft. Comment: The Russian (and to lesser extent Chinese) behavior in today's meeting leaves very little room for hope that an acceptable text can be agreed, and we will be surprised if the Monday morning session is not the last of this German-inspired effort. End summary and comment.

Russians (and Chinese) Unwilling to Talk Text

¶2. (C) Ambassador Luedeking opened the meeting by noting the recent and negative DG's report on Iran, as well as Iran's now familiar eleventh-hour ploy to cooperate on routine safeguards matters to get undeserved "bonus points" while still avoiding the fundamental issues at hand with the IAEA. Luedeking recalled that in light of this report the political directors on September 2 had agreed to authorize Vienna Missions to consider text for joint P5 1 statement on the Iran issue at the following week's IAEA Board of Governors meeting. Zmeyerovskiy disagreed with Luedeking's characterization of the political director's outcome and the meeting went downhill from there. He said there was no

mandate to discuss the German circulated text, and in fact he could not do so given that his political director had not agreed to that text. Zmeyerovskiy said the purpose of the meeting should be only to discuss whether a joint statement is desirable. He said he saw little changed since the last P5 1 joint Board statement in March, and feared that a statement focused on the negative could "scare away" the Iranians, when instead our goal is to get them to engage. A statement would only be helpful, therefore, if it stressed the positive and encouraged Iran. China seconded Russia's interpretation of the mandate from political directors and also said they couldn't comment on the text in any case because they had just received it.

13. (C) German, U.S., French and UK Ambassadors took turns rebutting the Russian interpretation of the PolDir's meeting mandate and marshaling arguments as to why and how productive work on a text could proceed so that capitals could consider more concretely the option of a joint statement. Luedeking repeatedly noted that any discussion of text was ad ref, the Russian Ambassador could comment in his personal capacity, as were all the others in the room. Amb. Davies echoed his point and stressed the imperative for a statement in the context of protecting the integrity of the IAEA regime even beyond the immediate Iran issue. French Amb. Mangin also said the mandate was to discuss text, even while acknowledging there was as yet no agreement on principle to issue a joint statement. UK Amb. Smith addressed the Russian query as to the desirability of a statement. He said the DG's latest report is sobering. More than one-third of the text is devoted to a review of outstanding issues suggestive of "possible military dimensions" to the Iranian nuclear

program. This report reflects mounting frustration on the part of the Secretariat and suggests inspectors may be moving toward concluding that Iran has no "innocent answers" and indeed must have been engaged in nuclear weapons-related work. Smith said the UK thought the German draft statement a good one, and not issuing a statement would send Tehran the wrong signal and risk reinforcing the impression that Iran can continue to expand its program and the P5 1 will not even take note. Addressing Zmeyerovskiy's earlier point that "little has changed," Amb. Davies agreed, and underlined that that is precisely the problem.

14. (C) Zmeyerovskiy proved impervious, asserting that he was for "balance," in any statement, but "balance the other way," asserting the statement should be positive. Zmeyerovskiy then suggested that if the group wanted to discuss text, it could discuss the September 2 press summary from the political directors meeting, which Zmeyerovskiy thought could serve as a good joint statement that was "balanced and concise." UK/Smith replied that the press summary was written to reflect a meeting of political directors. Any joint statement at the Board should instead focus on the developments relevant in Vienna, the latest of which was the DG's new report, which was overwhelmingly negative except for cooperation Iran should have undertaken long ago. Amb Davies labeled the press summary "cotton candy," when what was needed was "meat and potatoes" in light of the DG's report. It would be a dereliction of the task put before us by political directors not to at least attempt a text that, at the end of the process, is acceptable. The UK, Germany, and France all expressed the view that anything similar to the press statement would likely not fly with their capitals as statement for the Board.

Comment

15. (C) In the end, Luedeking pledged to take one more run at convening a productive discussion on text. He said he would circulate a revised, more concise text that integrated elements of both the German draft text and the September 2 press summary. He has called a meeting the morning of Monday, September 7 to discuss the text, which Mission will forward to Department via email once received. Especially in

light of Zmeyerovskiy's parting warning that he might not have instructions for Monday morning, Mission sees very little chance this process will bear fruit. Absent a surprising turn around on the part of the Russians Monday morning, Mission will (unless otherwise instructed) join a 3 1 consensus to bring this effort to a speedy conclusion so we can turn our energies to other BoG priorities.

DAVIES